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Abstract This article addresses corporate environmental responsibility (CER) and
aims to present a criminological analysis of it. We studied the opinion of a number of
principle actors involved in CER in Europe in order to determine how they perceive
it in terms of its definition, aetiology and approaches. For each of these dimensions
we relate back to a criminological framework to ascertain how it is positioned in the
green criminological debate. We start out by providing information on what
corporate environmental responsibility is and how it relates to corporate social
responsibility and sustainable development. Then we outline the theoretical
framework in accordance with the three central themes for the criminological
analysis of CER: definition, aetiology and approaches. We also explain the method
that was used (semi-structured interviews). Next, we present the results according to
the same threefold structure. Finally we discuss these results in a last part, which is
divided in two. First, we look at the challenges that the criminological perspective
poses for CER in terms of definition, aetiology and approaches. The second part of
the discussion turns the question around and wonders how CER could contribute to
greening criminology.
Introduction
“The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits [11].” With this quote,
Nobel prize-winning economist Milton Friedman indicated that the free market
would take care of everything and that it was needless for business to go beyond the
bottom line of making profits. Thirty years later the social responsibilities of
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business still have their supporters and opponents, but nevertheless these
responsibilities became pivotal issues on the global agenda of corporations, non-
governmental organisations and governments alike. Today, many acknowledge that
business has a responsibility which goes beyond profitability and reaches out to
profit, people as well as planet: a triple bottom line. This article sheds light on the
‘planet bottom line’ by addressing corporate environmental responsibility (CER).
We studied the opinion of a number of principle actors involved in CER in Europe in
order to determine how it is perceived in terms of definition, aetiology and
approaches. For each of these dimensions we relate back to a criminological
framework to ascertain how it is positioned in the green criminological debate.
Definition of corporate environmental responsibility
Corporate environmental responsibility (CER) is the commitment of business to take
the environment into account in decision-making processes and involves environ-
mental commitment and awareness, transparent reporting, measuring and auditing
and means going beyond regulatory compliance [26]. Due to its very complex and
multidimensional nature, it is hard for any definition to embrace all aspects of CER
[49]. CER originated in a broader trend towards a responsibility for business in
which various concepts, such as corporate social responsibility and sustainable
development, became central issues on the global agendas of business, non-
governmental organisations and governments alike. Firstly, CER has a clear
connection with corporate (social) responsibility (CSR) because it indicates its
environmental dimension.1 Ever since the seventies the term CSR has been used, but
up until today there is no commonly agreed definition of it. The definition entails
conceptualisations of CSR ranging from (1) mere regulatory compliance over (2) a
responsibility to shareholders, employees, customers and suppliers to (3) a broad-
minded perception of CSR as the responsibility of a company as a member of the
immediate society and the global community [26]. Quite often a definition of CSR
contains a mixture of these three perceptions. CSR can be perceived as the
commitment by business to pursue long term goals that reach beyond law and
economic requirements. It supposes a willingness to act ahead of regulatory
confrontation and suggests that corporations take the quality of life of all their
stakeholders2 into account. CSR means being a good corporate citizen through
decision-making that is not only based on financial or economic factors like profits
or return on investment, but also on the social, environmental and other
consequences of their activities [20, 26].3 Secondly, sustainable development
addresses sustainability in a very broad manner, whereas CSR specifies the
corporate dimension of it. CER can be perceived as sustainable development
1 Sometimes the concepts corporate citizenship and corporate environmental citizenship are used, which
are interchangeable with respectively CSR and CER.
2 Under this heading a stakeholder is everyone who can be influenced by a corporation’s actions or
decisions, which includes management, employees, shareholders, customers, suppliers, but also the local
community and society at large.
3 Communication COM(2006) 136 of 22 March 2006 on the implementing the partnership for growth and
jobs: making Europe a pole of excellence on corporate social responsibility.
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oriented towards the corporate and environmental dimension in particular. Corporate
environmental responsibility can be summarized as the responsibility of business
towards various stakeholders to take into account the environmental consequences of
business activities and the longer-term environmental needs in order to avoid
compromising the sustainability of future generations.
A criminological perspective on corporate environmental responsibility
As mentioned earlier, we look at three dimensions in our analysis of CER: definition,
aetiology and approaches. In this way we wish to ascertain how it relates to harmful
or criminal business activities and thus to a broader criminological perspective. In
the following paragraphs, we describe each of these dimensions and in the end refer
to the questions we take into account for the criminological analysis of CER.
First, we focus on the definition and thus the normative grounds, which inevitably
relates to the criminalization of environmentally harmful business activities. This holds
two dimensions: a corporate one and an environmental one. The former conceptualisa-
tion is that of corporate crime, which is often defined as: “illegal acts or omissions,
punishable under administrative, civil or criminal law, which are the result of the
deliberate decision-making or culpable negligence within a legitimate formal
organisation” [27, pp. 74–76]. This legalist definition attributes a pivotal role to the
law in defining crime. Others however argue that some acts may not violate the
criminal law although in se violent or harmful. Sutherland [42] believes this is
especially true for corporate behaviour because their harmful acts are often treated as
mere regulatory offences, which have no criminal stigma attached to it. Tombs [44]
exemplifies this by pointing to the enormous costs of corporate crimes: physical costs
in terms of health and safety, social costs and costs in terms of lacks of trust in
corporations and governments. He believes much too often corporate harm is
decriminalized, its victimization marginalized and thus not seen as a burden like
conventional crimes. When approaching it from an even more critical perspective, a
definition of crime is based on independent notions of human rights and thus goes far
beyond legal notions of criminal behaviour [35, 28, pp. 78–81]. The latter dimension
in the definition refers to environmental crime, which is mostly associated with
violations of (criminal) laws which are designed to protect the environment. Once
again, the extent to which environmentally harmful acts are regarded as crimes and
consequently criminalized, is dependent on the social and cultural environment’s
sensitivity to the subject. Some of this behaviour, such as illegal pollution or dumping
of waste, is sanctioned through criminal law—and thus considered a crime—while
other acts may violate administrative or civil regulations or might not violate any law
or regulation, but possess equally harmful potential.4 A more comprehensive definition
could thus take an ethical stance towards environmental harm: “Something criminal
may be unethical, but it does not follow that something not criminal is necessarily
ethical [29, p. 8]. Therein environmental crime could be regarded as acts that may or
may not violate rules and environmental regulations, that have environmental damage
4 This is the case when dangerous pesticides are sold in countries where appropriate regulation is lacking
or when waste is transported to countries where dumping is still allowed [47].
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outcomes and that originate in human action, whether corporate or individual [24]. A
more abstract definition of environmental damage is provided by constitutive
criminologists who state that it could be perceived as the power to deny others—
human, animal or nature—their ability to make a difference [17]. A first aspect to take
into account is thus the definition of CER and how it relates to the two above-
mentioned dimensions of corporate environmentally harmful activities.
Besides a look at the definition, we wish to include a vision on the aetiology in
our criminological analysis of CER. Even though numerous elements are mentioned
as explanatory factors in the etiology of criminality, Van Dijk et al. [48] believe these
elements can be narrowed down to three core factors: criminalization, motives and
opportunities. As opposed to conventional crime, corporate crime often stays off the
political agenda, rendering it not criminal or not illegal, seemingly regardless of its
costs. In order to paint a complete picture of corporate crime, it is therefore
necessary for the economic, political, social and cultural surroundings of the legal
and actual criminalization to be looked upon. Snider [39] refers to “[h]ow the
structural realities of the for-profit corporation and the relations of power they
generate, shape individual and collective habitus”. This process of criminalization
should thus be taken into account, besides elements of motivation and opportunity.
We do not intend to present an exhaustive explanation of the causes of corporate
environmental crime, but rather to highlight a number of important elements.5
Sutherland [43] made a strong claim about the criminogenic nature of corporations,
which he believed to be rooted in their rationalistic profit-making nature. Applying
rational choice theory to corporate crime in fact seems rather logical given the
capitalist corporations’ search for profit and the priority of this profit to all other
goals. Nevertheless, the picture is more complex than this claim. Various
criminologists [21, 34, 38, 7] argued to look beyond the micro-level of individual
executives and focus on meso (organisational) and macro (societal) levels as well.
Instead of looking for the rotten apples, we look at the rottening influence of the
barrel [13]. The corporation’s compliance or non-compliance with regulation is then
a result of certain motivations and opportunities based in the specific organisational
structure, culture and strategy. These explanations for corporate environmental crime
or harm are rooted in a broader philosophical perspective on the nature of human-
environment interaction: a view on the world and on humanity. Many green
criminologists have implicitly or explicitly drawn upon three main environmental
perspectives: anthropocentrism, biocentrism and ecocentrism6 [17, 18]. Anthropo-
centrism views the non-human environment for its instrumental worth and not for its
intrinsic value, decisions about the environment are weighed on their economic
outcome and it is therefore sometimes referred to as liberal ecology. Biocentrism has
its ideological basis for activity not in self-interest, but in biotic interest. Decisions
about the environment rely on righteous management and environmental laws are
5 These explanations concern corporate crime in general, but are applied to corporate environmental crime
in particular.
6 Ethical literature makes a distinction between anthropocentrism, zoo-centrism and ecocentrism/
biocentrism. Biocentrism would in fact be referred to as zoo-centrism while the term biocentrism would
be used as a synonym for ecocentrism. Content-wise the threefold separation is equal, but criminological
literature refers to anthropocentric, biocentric and ecocentric whereas ethics refers to anthropocentrism,
zoo-centrism and ecocentrism/biocentrism [8].
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informed by the idea of moral equivalence of all species. Ecocentrism tries to find a
balance between the conception on nature of anthropocentrism and biocentrism and
believes that the solutions for environmental harm lie in the social rather than the
biological. Regarding this matter of aetiology, we thus wonder what philosophical
roots CER has and to what view on criminalization, motives and opportunities it
corresponds according to different stakeholders.
Together with a focus on the definition and the aetiology, we believe a third
consideration in providing a criminological analysis of CER, resides in a view on
approaches. These approaches for corporate environmentally harmful behaviour are
positioned on a continuum between stick and carrot [46, 33]. Rule-based measures
aimed at punishing bad behaviour constitute repressive or stick-approaches.
Principle-based initiatives aimed at encouraging good behaviour belong to
preventive or carrot-approaches. Repression concerns punitive responses to
environmental problems caused by corporations and the prosecution of these cases
in the criminal justice systems but it also involves administrative or civil measures
such as fines or suspensions of licenses. The central responsibility for repressive
approaches lies with the regulatory institutions (government) [42]. The focal concern
of carrot-approaches is the encouragement of good behaviour instead of the
punishment of bad. This concerns the idea of anticipating environmental crime
which, in turn, brings us to the idea of prevention. These preventive initiatives aim at
enhancing internal and external informal social control (social prevention) [48]. It
does not only include preventive initiatives in se but also regards self-regulation of
the company or the sector. These approaches embrace various influential elements
within corporations and within the broader socio-economic and political context.
The question we will try to answer in our criminological analysis of CER is where it
is positioned on this continuum between carrot and stick.
Method
We opted for a qualitative research design. More specifically, in-depth interviews
were gathered from a number of principle actors of CER in the EU on the three
topics discussed above (definition, aetiology, approaches). The interview methodol-
ogy was applied and more in particular the semi-structured interview was chosen
[19]. This interview was semi-structured so that a framework of questions was
prepared but the order of the questions depended on the course of the interview. This
allowed for an exploration of the perceptions and interpretations of experiences of a
specific phenomenon and resulted in focused though conversational communication.
We purposefully selected as observations those principle actors involved in corporate
environmental responsibility: the governmental, corporate, employee as well as
NGO perspective. This corresponds to the various stakeholders engaged in CER,
although we must mention shareholders were not included. For the governmental
perspective two Directorates General of the European Commission were contacted.
Firstly, the Directorate General for the Environment because they are a core actor for
the development of environmental policy and corporate environmental responsibility
initiatives on EU level. Secondly, the Directorate General Employment, Social
Affairs and Equal Opportunities was contacted because they communicate the EU
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position on CSR. For the corporate viewpoint we decided to survey ‘Business
Europe’7 because they are the representative body for corporations of various sectors
in all EU Member States. For the employee perspective, a representative from the
International Trade Union Confederation, was contacted. At last, Friends of the Earth
Europe and the European Coalition for Corporate Justice were chosen for an insight
from NGO perspective because they have both obtained special expertise on the
relationship between business, government and the environment. This subset8 can be
justified from the belief that it best represents the differing perspectives actively
contributing to contemporary CER-practice. The unique perspective offered by each
party offers a distinct way to conceptualize contemporary CER-practice. However,
we surpass a holistic view, and offer a comparative analysis of the how these views
differ/agree. The transcripts of the five interviews were processed into a matrix
structure. This data matrix served as a guideline for the horizontal and vertical
analysis of the interviews. Along the horizontal axis are the different questions
(including relevant subsections) and along the vertical axis, the different actors are
represented. In first instance, a comparison of the different respondents was
presented (horizontal analysis) by which we aimed to investigate to what extent
there is a consensus between actors. The subsequent vertical analysis checked
whether the responses were internally consistent. In this way we aimed to measure
reliability across the different actors by means of the horizontal analysis and within
the actors individually in the vertical analysis.9
Our data collection was restricted in a number of ways that might impact the
interpretation of the results. We discuss these limitations to put our findings in a
proper perspective. First and for all, we recognize the limited number of interviewed
subjects. These were selected in order to provide a representative overview of the
principle actors involved in CER in the EU, but still consisted of a limited subset (for
instance the viewpoint of the costumer or society itself was unaccounted for) and the
results can therefore never be seen as a complete overview of the current CER
practice in the EU. Secondly, although we attempted to provide an exhaustive review
of relevant literature, there are undoubtedly some perspectives which were not
accounted for. In contrast, the overview on criminological perspectives presented
here, is thought to be the most relevant subset towards our objectives. Finally, it is
7 Business Europe is the European business organisation and represents 39 national business federations
from 33 European countries. It was formerly known as UNICE (Union des industries de la communauté
européenne). Their mission and priorities include : implementation of reforms for growth and jobs,
integration of the European market, efficient governance of the EU, fighting national protectionism, taking
advantage of the opportunities of enlargement and reforming the European social systems to make them
sustainable. http://www.businesseurope.eu
8 Interview with a member of the Cabinet Commission for the Environment, European Commission
Directorate General Environment, Brussels, 21 May 2007.; Interview with ‘Friends of the Earth Europe’
and ‘European Coalition for Corporate Justice’, Brussels, 22 May 2007.; Interview with a member of
directorate D2 European Employment Strategy, CSR and Local Development, European Commission
Directorate General Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Brussels, 23 May 2007.;
Interview with a member of Business Europe, Brussels, 24 May 2007.;Interview with an employee of the
Economy and Social Policy Department, International Trade Union Confederation, telephone, 24 May
2007.
9 In presenting our analysis of the interviews, we name institutions, however it is important to stress that
even though these respondents are representatives for their organisation, we cannot exclude their personal
opinion.
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important to keep in mind that the method of analysis was explorative. Although this
was a clear choice related to the objective of this study and we tried to triangulate [1]
and cross-validate interpretations, this method only allowed for general conclusions
and not for specific recommendations that might result from a more rigorous
empirical design. Based on the results described below, future research should
include more rigorous empirical methods for a well-defined subset of respondents
(for instance one specific sector) to increase explanatory power.
Results
Definition
Each of the respondents presented a definition of CER except the representative
from the DG Environment. Friends of the Earth Europe (FoE) and the European
Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ) defined it as “corporate accountability for the
environment”. Business Europe spoke of “responsibility for business in terms of
environmental issues”. The DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportuni-
ties (DG ESE) called it the “integration of environmental issues into business”. The
International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) presented the following elaborate
definition: “an ethical system in which the management of an enterprise takes into
account the impacts of the regular activities of the business on others in ways
consistent with welfare of society and sustainable development”. At first glance,
these definitions indicate a consensus between the actors. In order to have an
accurate idea about the scope of these definitions, we asked a number of sub
questions, which revealed the initial consensus to be more complex.
First, we asked whether they believed CER to be oriented towards corporate
environmental crime or towards a broader notion of corporate environmental
harm. All respondents immediately connected this crime versus harm discussion
to the notion of CER being voluntary or obligatory (cf. approaches). Both NGO’s
clung to obligatory regulation and stressed it definitely includes more than crime
in se because harmful acts are not necessarily criminalized. The DG ESE on the
other hand responded that everything that had to do with legislation was opposite
to CER and thus swore by a definition that is outside criminal or judicial
reference. Business Europe and DG Environment preferred CER to be voluntary,
but both mentioned the importance of a legally binding framework in order to be
effective. They thus perceived CER to be principally outside of judicial
discussions, but practically touching upon legal shores. The DG Environment
clarified CER actually went beyond criminal notions because it also takes
economic measures into account. Secondly we asked to specify whether it
involved solely deliberate decision-making or also culpable negligence. FoE and
ECCJ stressed that CER involved more than deliberate decision making because
“business is equally accountable when gas is deliberately flared or when there is
a gas pipeline accident, because the polluting and harming outcome is equal”.
Business Europe and the DG ESE supported this view by saying that the
anticipation of culpable negligence is an inherent part of CER. The answers of
the ITUC representative are difficult to compare to the others: he believed it is
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not important to distinguish whether CER should be legally binding or voluntary,
neither is it important to determine what it entails because there is a need to gain
understanding of the core problem before addressing it.
Aetiology
Regarding this matter of aetiology we study the philosophical roots of CER and
their view on criminalization, motives and opportunities in relation to CER. The
representative of Business Europe emphasized different motivations are simul-
taneously involved in this matter and distinguishing which one is more important
than the other is relative. First, there is the direct profit interest in going green
(definitely more than in going social) and thus the business case for CER in
terms of public relations and corporate image. Secondly, business is also a
member of society and therefore CER refers to an ethical motivation (e.g.
corporate citizenship). Thirdly, an important drive is the need to comply with
legislation. When interviewing the DG ESE representative, the win-win situation
was mentioned when asked about the motivations: on the one hand, this refers to
the benefits for the environment and, on the other hand, to the business case for
CER. She emphasized that this win-win situation was the objective in the EU
policy on CER, which thus aims for a balance between ecological and economic
well-being. The representative of the DG Environment equally referred to a
range of motivations underlying the CER/CSR argument. First only anthropo-
centric motives and the intrinsic value of nature were mentioned, but in later
answers he referred to corporate image building, and thus to the business case
for being green. The ITUC representative countered this win-win argument. He
referred to eco-efficiencies which indeed lowered the environmental footprint and
made companies more profitable, even in the short term. However, the main gain
is in the sustainability of a company and the protection of the brand name rather
than in true environmental sustainability (e.g. green washing). He further
explained that the business case for CER is more immediate than for CSR, due
to environmental performance being quite easily quantifiable. Both NGO’s
emphasized the main motivation for CER should be the value of nature, and for
the broader CSR picture, the value of the social as well. Nevertheless, they
reluctantly mentioned a more anthropocentric and economic argument would
have to be apparent as well in order to enthuse society.
The two main motivations, economic and ethical, seem to reside on the opposite
ends of a continuum. First of all, there is the business case for CER which involves
the protection of the corporate image and the sustainability of the company, but also
the direct profit interests in ‘going green’. This motivation fits within anthropocen-
trism and more in particular relates to liberal ecology, but is not necessarily limited
to an anthropocentric stance because the self-interest of the corporations might be
enlightened. This enlightened self-interest brings us to the second motivation to
establish CER, which is ethical and concerns the well being of the environment and
of society. The perceptions of the principle actors on these motivations diverge: on
the one hand there are those who believe it can be a win-win situation (e.g. eco-
efficiency) but on the other hand there are disbelievers who criticize this win-win
phrasing (e.g. green wash).
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Approaches
The question we will try to answer in our criminological analysis of CER is where it
is positioned on the continuum between carrot and stick and what elements need to
be taken into account when discussing the approaches.
On whether CER approaches were of preventive or repressive nature, our
respondents had differing views. Both NGO’s were of the opinion that binding
minima are needed, but nuanced this by specifying that contemporary good
practices already go above the baseline of responsible corporate behaviour and
above binding minimum standards. This good behaviour should thus be
encouraged and these good practices can motivate others to follow similar
routes. Anything above binding minima, needs to be encouraged, but everything
below needs to be challenged legally. The Business Europe respondent
considered imposing standards was useless. He believed CER or CSR needs to
be intrinsic and based on ethical beliefs in order to make sense. ITUC was of the
opinion it would need regulation, because not all companies would be
enlightened. He emphasized business nowadays has few legal obligations to
adhere to anyway. The DG ESE referred to the voluntary nature which was
supported by the DG Environment interviewee who said that at the Commission
level the choice was made to support the industry initiatives on CER/CSR rather
than imposing a framework for it from the central level. The respondent from the
DG ESE furthermore said that CER needed to go beyond the law and should be
established on voluntary basis. However, when asked about the responsibility for
CER, both DG representatives referred to the responsibility for government as
well as business to set standards. The DG ESE was of the opinion CER in the
EU is about stimulating the good behaviour, although outside the EU it can
sometimes be a matter of compliance alone. The DG Environment however
believed ‘carrot’ is included in the process but it also concerns trying to stop
companies from harming the environment which means disincentives. The other
three respondents also agreed it entails both carrot and stick.
Each of the respondents pointed to the necessity of an integrated and integral
approach within the companies. They believed CER, just like corporate governance,
represents a core element of a company’s strategy, while affecting different elements
within a corporation which might provide motives or opportunities for environmen-
tal harmful behaviour. They all perceived it important for a corporation’s culture,
structure as well as strategy to be integrated in corporate environmental
responsibility.
Concerning the responsibilities for CER there was considerable consensus in the
sense that all respondents perceived it to be a shared responsibility between
government and business and recognized NGO’s as important actors in CER.
However, who is principally responsible differs along the actors. FoE and ECCJ
stand alone with their opinion that government is the principle actor. The others
attribute the principle responsibility to business. ITUC follows another line of
reasoning by emphasizing the need to know what government and business can
address adequately before addressing who is responsible.
The question about strengths and weaknesses of CER was answered rather
differently. In first instance, FoE and ECCJ referred to problems with legislation
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which concerned the existence of safe havens10 and the sectional nature of
environmental policy. Secondly, they also mentioned there are a number of
corporate good practices of CER, but they warned for green corporate images
which only address one particular business activity in a green manner while the
rest is left to function as it always has (green-wash). Both NGO’s emphasized a
need for transparency, raising awareness and research on environmental issues and
believed the EU has a leading role to play on a global level because CER and CSR
need supranational standards in order to be adequate. Business Europe mentioned
the importance of the intrinsic values and the need to improve communication
between business and NGO’s, but emphasized things were going in the right
direction. They believed that, on global level, the EU could be a forerunner in
environmental legislation and environmental friendly technologies, but creating
legislation for CER or CSR will not have an effect on CER strategies in China,
India or other countries. The DG ESE said it was too soon to evaluate any
strengths or weaknesses because the EU communication was only from 2006.11
They did mention that the CSR Alliance and the eco-management and audit
scheme12 (EMAS) were both considered as success stories. The respondent from
the DG Environment pointed to the problems with the implementation of
legislation at the national levels which resulted in many infringements of
Community Law regarding the environmental sector. He also made particular
reference to green-washing and mentioned that there are a lot of differences in
corporate interest: there are heavy polluters who try to lower legislation; there is
the eco-technology business who like higher legislation because they get
subsidised; there are the progressive industries, the General Electric’s and
Toyota’s, for whom being green is a question of branding; but then there are the
small and medium sized enterprises who often do not have the resources to know
or comply to their obligations. Finally, he also stated the polemic between NGO’s
and business was not conducive to CER. The trade union representative took this
question as an opportunity to repeat the importance of addressing the core values
and investigating the core problem before discussing CER or CSR, because this
can only contribute to solving problems and is not a solution on its own. He
claimed it was currently too often a dialogue of the dead. He referred to the global
economy and the absence of institutions available alike to those available at a
national level: “it seems likely that when things go global the rules do not apply.”
However, he did not believe problems would be solved “by a voluntary optional
dependence on the enlightened self-interest of management, because there is no
evidence that has ever worked.”
10 IP/07/166 of 9 February 2007 Commission strengthens environmental protection through criminal laws
abolishing “safe havens” of environmental crime.; Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003
on the protection of the environment through criminal law.; Studygroup Meeting NAT 353 on
environmental crime, European Economic and Social Committee, 16 May 2007.
11 Note 10117/06 of 9 June 2006 Review of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy (EU SDS) –
Renewed Strategy.
12 Regulation 761/2001 of 19 March 2001 allowing voluntary participation by organisations in a
Community eco-management and audit scheme (EMAS).
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Discussion
A criminological perspective as a challenge for CER
In the above we have mentioned that the opinions of the EU stakeholders differentiated
on the three core themes. In what follows, we wish to substantiate these results and point
to the challenges for CER, arising from the criminological perspective.
In the beginning of this article, we already mentioned that it is very difficult to
define CER satisfactory because of its complexity and multidimensional nature. This
opinion can be confirmed based on the interviews with the different actors: as CER
lies on the crossroads of different interests each respondent offered an important but
meanwhile limited perspective on CER. Currently there seems to be no common
mindset for CER let alone a common definition or approach. We note that the
answers of the stakeholders are situated on a continuum from being beyond every
notion of criminality or illegality to reaching out to all notions of environmentally
harmful business activities. This latter stance corresponds to a perspective where
CER refers to various acts and omissions that cause harm and may be defined
punishable under administrative, civil of criminal law. On the other side of the
continuum one seems to shy away from criminal or legal connotations to CER. The
stakeholders we interviewed had different viewpoints on where the core business of
CER resides and also on its future possibilities. Moreover, even within the viewpoint
of each stakeholder we notice seeming inconsistencies between what they ideally
envision CER to be and what they deem practically achievable. Given this difference
in opinion, there is a need to acknowledge the differentiation between the various
actors, businesses and levels and address the core problem while taking those
differences into account, but without allowing these different viewpoints to paralyze
communication. In current CER practice, the communication between NGO’s and
business is often polarized and consequently paralysed. Changing this will require an
open mind from business, NGO’s as well as government. Responsibility and
sustainability both vary across time and place, but their content needs attuning. As
such we believe that rather than being a practice of multi-action, contemporary CER
practice should be oriented towards inter-action.
Secondly, an apparent hierarchy in the aetiology for CER was identified.
Although all stakeholders agreed on the involvement of ethical motivations, each
actor emphasized that an economic motive practically preceded an ethical stance. It
seems as though the bottom-line of every CER approach points towards ethical
considerations but practical implementation is hindered by economic motives. We
wish to stress this is closely related to criminalization processes and to whether or
not we look beyond traditional notions of criminality. It might be difficult to include
ethical arguments within the rational profit making context of business, but this
might prove to be inevitable when other organizational and societal goals than profit
are at stake. Nowadays, not all environmentally harmful and unethical corporate
activities are legally considered as such and neither are they perceived to be a burden
on society to the same extent traditional offenders seem to be [44]. As long as CER
is not a concern for different actors (government, companies, NGO’s, etc.) as well as
a topic of interest in different playing fields (economic, social, political, etc.), it is
not likely to be a genuine concern in society.
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Approaches can be found on a continuum from voluntary (carrot) to
obligatory (stick) [3]. Throughout the results, it became clear that, in order to
address the environmental problems effectively, CER should encompasses a
mixture of initiatives. Furthermore, rather than straightforward application ideally
these initiatives are integrated, within the corporations as well as in society. This
will require understanding about the various elements inside and outside
organisations; different levels of the phenomenon- micro, meso and macro- and
various factors, actors and processes involved need consideration. Voluntary
initiatives will be an essential element in obtaining environmental sustainability,
but they will not be sufficient because not all will be enlightened. Voluntary
business initiatives are not a panacea for all and neither is governmental regulation
[31, 23]. In the absence of a credible threat of regulation or taxation, some
companies will still be tempted to inflict harm upon the environment [45].
According to Campbell’s [5] institutional theory of corporate social responsibility,
corporations are likely to behave socially responsible when certain economic
conditions13 are present, but these are in all probability mediated by a variety of
institutional conditions, such as the strength of state regulation or (collective)
industrial self-regulation, monitoring of corporations by NGO’s or other indepen-
dent organizations, the presence of institutionalized norms regarding appropriate
corporate behaviour, associative behaviour between corporations and organized
dialogue amid corporations and their stakeholders. Therefore, ideal solutions
(KPMG & UNEP 2006) are probably in a mixture of voluntary or self-regulatory
initiatives and mandatory regulations, which embrace advantages and overcomes
disadvantages of both.14 “If acts proscribed by law are not translated into naming,
blaming and shaming in the day to day playing field of business, formal social
control is left but it is reactive and hugely problematic.” [39, p. 49]. It is unlikely to
have a culture of compliance unless you have a culture of ethics supporting it. Di
Mento (1998, p. 73) phrased it as such: “No enforcement strategy, when considered
alone, universally motivates the corporation to behave”.
In all of this, the corporations themselves have an important role to play by
presenting good and best practices which can serve as an incentive for their
competitors. Corporations have a responsibility to prove to society that they are
worthy of their trust and should cultivate this by demonstrating that CER is more
than a paper programme [37]. We can categorize this as a ‘responsibilization’
strategy [12], which relates to a basic sociological truth that the most important
processes producing order and conformity are mainstream social processes, located
within the institutions of civil society and not the uncertain threat of legal sanctions.
Examples of this are allowing the industry to regulate itself [2] or co-operating with
various stakeholders when establishing control institutions. Possible strategies are
13 The relative health of the corporation and the economy, the level of competition.
14 Advantages of self-regulation lie in its proximity, flexibility and ability to generate a higher level of
compliance in which competitors might ‘police’ each other. Disadvantages are interest conflicts,
inadequate sanctions, monitoring and enforcement and the global competition. Advantages of mandatory
standards are credibility, legal certainty, standardization, comparability, the disclosure of negative
performance and full reports and the avoidance of free-riders. Mandatory standards have the disadvantage
of being inflexible, lack incentives for innovation, pose constraints on efficiency and competitiveness and
undermine tailored response.
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information, self-regulation, incentives, environmental management systems and
environmental reporting (e.g. European Pollutant Emission Register15; European
Eco-label16; Eco-Management and Audit Scheme) [16, 15]. This however assumes a
basic degree of trust in organisations and their functioning [45], which is an idea that
is countered by many critics of the capitalist system [44]. Although business ethics
(CER/CSR) might be considered to be an oxymoron by some, we believe it holds
potential in dealing with corporate (environmentally) harmful activities. Neverthe-
less, we should not deny profitability is key to the functioning of organizations.
Being publicly traded, corporations need to live up to expectations of stockholders,
causing a potential criminogenic character of their activities.
One of the weaknesses of self-regulation is a lack of control and therefore there is
also an important role for governments to play. It is their responsibility to make
repressive approaches to corporate environmental crime live up to their full potential
and to prove value would be lost in dismissing this approach. This means the
governments have a responsibility to overcome the difficulties faced in the
criminalization (e.g. crime vs. harm), investigation (e.g. unidentified victims17),
prosecution (e.g. burden of proof) and punishment (cf. corporate liability, limited
liability) of these offences [6, 22]. The intergovernmental and supranational level
(e.g. EU) has an important role to play in establishing compatible global standards
for CER which should go hand in hand with raising awareness. Several respondents
mentioned this is likely to work for CER (rather than for CSR) because of the
current ‘hype’ about environmental issues but also because environmental
performance is easy to quantify and comes with a clear business case. Global
standards are needed to overcome the problems faced today due to differing
standards on environmental issues internationally and even within the EU. The
European Union realised there was a deficiency in the punishment of environmental
offences and tried to answer to this problem by means of creating minimum
standards for definitions and sanctions of environmental harm.18, 19 However, there
is still a long way to go in order to have an effective and efficient sanctioning across
the EU.20
15 Decision 2000/479/EC of 17 July 2000 on the implementation of a European Pollutant Emission
Register (EPER) according to Article 15 of Council Directive 96/61/EC concerning integrated pollution
prevention and control (IPPC)
16 Regulation 1980/2000 of 17 July 2000 on a revised Community eco-label scheme.
17 In literature these crimes are often called ‘victimless’, but the term ‘unknown’ is preferred over
‘victimless’, because they are not victimless in se.
18 Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003 on the protection of the environment through
criminal law.
19 MEMO 05/437 of 23 November 2005 Commission welcomes Court of Justice judgement recognising
the exclusive competence of the Community to adopt criminal law measures to ensure the effectiveness of
Community law.
20 Several Member States were reluctant to give the EU a say over such a sensitive issue as criminal
sanctions. Nevertheless, the first crucial steps are taken to do away ‘safe havens’ for environmental crime
with the adoption of the Directive on October 24th 2008.
(IP/07/166 of 9 February 2007 Commission strengthens environmental protection through criminal las,
abolishing “safe havens” of environmental crime.; European Parliament legislative resolution of 21 May
2008 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the
environment through criminal law (adopted on October 24th 2008) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/seance_pleniere/textes_consolides/2007/0022/EP-PE_TC1-COD(2007)0022_EN.pdf)
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Criminology offered an interesting frame of analysis as a starting point for the
analysis of corporate environmental responsibility. We note the perspectives on CER
reside on different continuums: (1) from being beyond (excluding) to going beyond
(including) all notions of criminality; (2) from being ethical to being profitable; and
(3) from voluntary to obligatory. The exact position on the continuums is seemingly
dependent on whether it concerns either a practical or a principal stance. To conclude
this article we would like to indicate that it is equally important to turn the question
around and see how CER can contribute to criminology.
CER as a challenge for criminology
Even though criminology is concerned with various aspects and dimensions of harm,
up until today neither corporate nor environmental crime are majority interests in
mainstream criminological thought. We believe looking beyond traditional notions
and broadening the scope to harm remains a challenge to the concept of crime and a
challenge to criminology [30, 29].
On the one hand, criminology has generally focused on the individual and mostly
failed to address the organizational or corporate level [44]. Starting with Sutherland, a
number of criminologists have studied corporate crime. Some of them [41, 28] looked
for motivations and rationalizations offered at the corporate level (criminogenic
corporation), while others [4, 32, 38] expressed a more radical claim about the capitalist
system being criminogenic in se. Nevertheless, on the whole criminologists focus on the
conventional offender and conventional crime. Therefore, we might say corporate crime
remains a challenge to the concept of crime as well as to criminology [29].
On the other hand, criminology has also generally kept rather silent about
environmental issues [17]. Despite their significance and harmfulness, environmen-
tal crimes have not yet been fully acknowledged as a field of study in criminology
[40]. Some studies have touched upon the shores of greening criminology by
exploring dimensions of environmental damage, crime and victimization or
environmental regulation (e.g. [10, 14, 36]. At times, environmental crime and
criminality is thus acknowledged as a dimension of criminology (e.g. [9]), but it is
still absent in some exemplary criminological books such as the Oxford Handbook
of Criminology [25]. This is in contrast to the attention they have received in
international organisations like the UN, EU and many NGO’s. The challenge to
create a ‘green’ criminology and to acknowledge crimes against the environment as
a field of study in criminology has only been taken up in the last two decades. Green
criminology suggests to move beyond acknowledging the existence of these
environmental problems and to reach out for solutions and responses [24, 17, 40,
50]. It proposes to reconsider traditional notions of crimes, offences and harmful
behaviour and to examine the role that society, corporations and governments play in
generating environmental degradation [6]. South [40] believes green criminology is
the answer to new needs arising in a society where an environmental agenda is of
increasing importance. In order to address the environmental problems of today and
tomorrow, we believe criminology should move beyond the traditional knowledge
frameworks of defining crime and criminologists ought to examine corporate
environmental issues in ways that incorporate the growing complexity and
multidimensionality of our society. We believe it is important to apply the existing
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knowledge framework of criminology and add new dimensions [40]. Therefore, any
criminological analysis of corporate environmentally harmful activities should keep
an open and mutually respected dialogue with both ethic rationale and economic
motive. Both perspectives should be incorporated in any response to corporate
environmental crime/harm related problems—or whatever concept is agreed upon
(cf. criminalization)—because ultimately these perceptions about the motivations
directly influence what determines an appropriate approach. As such, we recognise
the continuous interaction with other fields of interest. We believe this is especially
tangible in the discussion on CER, as illustrated above. This will allow a more
thorough understanding of all the surroundings and consequently allows to present a
broader scope on the studied phenomenon.
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